Abstract. We put forward a new algebraic framework to generalize and analyze DiffieHellman like decisional assumptions which allows us to argue about security and applications by considering only algebraic properties. Our D ,k -MDDH Assumption states that it is hard to decide whether a vector in G is linearly dependent of the columns of some matrix in G ×k sampled according to distribution D ,k . It covers known assumptions such as DDH, 2-Lin (Linear Assumption) and k-Lin (the k-Linear Assumption). Using our algebraic viewpoint, we can relate the generic hardness of our assumptions in * Funded by ERC Grant ERC307952 Fast and Sound Cryptography. In particular, our new assumptions 2-SCasc and 2-ILin are generically hard in bilinear groups and, compared to 2-Lin, have shorter description size, which is a relevant parameter for efficiency in many applications. These results support using our new assumptions as natural replacements for the 2-Lin assumption which was already used in a large number of applications. To illustrate the conceptual advantages of our algebraic framework, we construct several fundamental primitives based on any MDDH Assumption. In particular, we can give many instantiations of a primitive in a compact way, including public-key encryption, hash proof systems, pseudo-random functions, and Groth-Sahai NIZK and NIWI proofs. As an independent contribution, we give more efficient NIZK and NIWI proofs for membership in a subgroup of G . The results imply very significant efficiency improvements for a large number of schemes.
Introduction
Arguably, one of the most important cryptographic hardness assumptions is the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. For a fixed additive group G of prime order q and a generator P of G, we denote by [a] := aP ∈ G the implicit representation of an element a ∈ Z q . The DDH Assumption states
that ([a], [r ], [ar]) ≈ c ([a], [r ], [z]) ∈
G 3 , where a, r, z are uniform elements in Z q and ≈ c denotes computationally indistinguishability of the two distributions. It has been used in numerous important applications such as secure encryption [12] , key exchange [20] , hash proof systems [13] , pseudorandom functions [37] and many more.
Bilinear Groups and the Linear Assumption. Bilinear groups (i.e., groups G, G T of prime order q equipped with a bilinear map e : G × G → G T ) [4, 24] revolutionized cryptography in recent years and are the basis for a large number of cryptographic protocols. However, relative to a (symmetric) bilinear map, the DDH Assumption is no longer true in the group G. (This is since e ([a] , [r ] ) = e( [1] , [ar] ) and hence [ar] is not longer pseudo-random given [a] and [r ] .) The need for an "alternative" decisional assumption in G was quickly addressed with the Linear Assumption (2-Lin) introduced by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [3] . It [3] and it has virtually become the standard decisional assumption in the group G in the bilinear setting. It has found applications to encryption [5, 7, 29, 38] , signatures [3] , zero-knowledge proofs [21] , pseudo-random functions [6] and many more. More recently, the 2-Lin assumption was generalized to the (k-Lin) k∈N Assumption family [23, 45] (1-Lin = DDH), a family of increasingly (strictly) weaker Assumptions which are generically hard in k-linear maps.
Subgroup Membership Problems. Since the work of Cramer and Shoup [13] , it has been recognized that it is useful to view the DDH Assumption as a hard subgroup membership problem in G 2 . In this formulation, the DDH Assumption states that it is hard to decide whether a given element ([r ], [t] ) ∈ G 2 is contained in the subgroup generated by ( [1] , [a] [1] ). The same holds for the (k-Lin) k∈N Assumption family: For each k, the k-Lin assumption can be naturally written as a hard subgroup membership problem in G k+1 . This alternative formulation has conceptual advantages for some applications; for instance, it allowed to provide more instantiations of the original DDH-based scheme of Cramer and Shoup and it is also the most natural point of view for translating schemes originally constructed in composite order groups into prime order groups [18, 36, 43, 44] .
Linear Algebra in Bilinear Groups. In its formulation as subgroup decision membership problem, the k-Lin assumption can be seen as the problem of deciding linear dependence "in the exponent." Recently, a number of works have illustrated the usefulness of a more algebraic point of view on decisional assumptions in bilinear groups, like the Dual Pairing Vector Spaces of Okamoto and Takashima [40] or the Subspace Assumption of Lewko [32] . Although these new decisional assumptions reduce to the 2-Lin assumption, their flexibility and their algebraic description have proven to be crucial in many works to obtain complex primitives in strong security models previously unrealized in the literature, like attribute-based encryption, unbounded inner product encryption and many more (see [32, 41, 42] , just to name a few). This Work. Motivated by the success of this algebraic viewpoint of decisional assumptions, in this paper we explore new insights resulting from interpreting the k-Lin decisional assumption as a special case of what we call a Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption. The general problem states that it is hard to distinguish whether a given vector in G is contained in the space spanned by the columns of a certain matrix [A] ∈ G ×k , where A is sampled according to some distribution D ,k . We remark that even though all our results are stated in symmetric bilinear groups, they can be naturally extended to the asymmetric setting.
The Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption
A New Framework for DDH-like Assumptions. For integers > k let D ,k be an (efficiently samplable) distribution over Z ×k q . We define the D ,k -Matrix DH (D ,k -MDDH) Assumption as the following subgroup decision assumption:
where A ∈ Z ×k q is chosen from distribution D ,k , r ← Z k q , and u ← G . The (k-Lin) k∈N family corresponds to this problem when = k + 1, and D ,k is the specific distribution L k (formally defined in Example 2).
Generic Hardness. Due to its linearity properties, the D ,k -MDDH Assumption does not hold in (k + 1)-linear groups. In Sect. 3.3, we give two different theorems which state sufficient conditions for the D ,k -MDDH Assumption to hold generically in mlinear groups. Theorem 3 is very similar to the Uber-Assumption [2, 9] that characterizes hardness in bilinear groups (i.e., m = 2) in terms of linear independence of polynomials in the inputs. We generalize this to arbitrary m using a more algebraic language. This algebraic formulation has the advantage that one can use additional tools (e.g., Gröbner bases or resultants) to show that a distribution D ,k meets the conditions of Theorem 3, which is specially important for large m. It also allows to prove a completely new result, namely Theorem 4, which states that a matrix assumption with = k + 1 is generically hard if a certain determinant polynomial is irreducible.
New Assumptions for Bilinear Groups. We propose other families of generically hard decisional assumptions that did not previously appear in the literature, e.g., those associated with C k , SC k , IL k defined below. For the most important parameters k = 2 and = k + 1 = 3, we consider the following examples of distributions: for uniform a, a 1 , a 2 ∈ Z q as well as U 3,2 , the uniform distribution in Z 3×2 q (already considered in [5, 19, 38, 46] ). All assumptions are hard in generic bilinear groups. It is easy to verify that L 2 -MDDH = 2-Lin. We define 2-Casc := C 2 -MDDH (Cascade Assumption), 2-SCasc := SC 2 -MDDH (Symmetric Cascade Assumption), and 2-ILin := IL 2 -MDDH (Incremental Linear Assumption). In Sect. 3.4, we show that 2-SCasc ⇒ 2-Casc, 2-ILin ⇒ 2-Lin and that U 3,2 -MDDH is the weakest of these assumptions (which extends the results of [18, 19, 46] for 2-Lin). Although originally [16] 2-ILin and 2-SCasc were thought to be incomparable assumptions, in Sect. 4 we show that 2-SCasc and 2-ILin are indeed equivalent assumptions. The equivalence result, together with the fact that 2-ILin ⇒ 2-Lin, implies that 2-SCasc is a stronger assumption than 2-Lin. respectively. Using our results on generic hardness, it is easy to verify that all three assumptions are generically hard in k-linear groups. Actually, in Sect. 4 we show that k-SCasc and k-ILin are equivalent for every k. Since all these assumptions are false in (k + 1)-linear groups, this gives us three new families of increasingly strictly weaker assumptions. 1 In particular, the k-SCasc (equivalently, k-ILin) assumption family is of great interest due to its compact representation size of only 1 element.
Relations to Other Standard Assumptions. Surprisingly, the new assumption families can also be related to standard assumptions. The k-Casc Assumption is implied by the (k + 1)-party Diffie-Hellman Assumption ((k + 1)-PDDH) [7] which states that Figure 1 on page 10 gives an overview over the relations between the different assumptions.
Uniqueness of One-Parameter Family. The most natural and useful D ,k -MDDH assumptions are those with = k + 1, and the entries of the matrices generated by D ,k are polynomials of degree one in some parameters. Among them, the most compact correspond to the one-parameter distributions. As novel contribution with respect to [16] , in Sect. 4 we show that k-ILin and k-SCasc are tightly equivalent. Moreover, we prove that every D k -MDDH assumption defined by univariate polynomials of degree one is tightly equivalent to k-SCasc, so we can see k-SCasc as a sort of canonical compact Matrix DH assumption. From the equivalence proof between k-ILin and k-SCasc, one can easily construct a reduction from k-SCasc to k-Lin.
Basic Applications
We believe that all schemes based on 2-Lin can be shown to work for any Matrix Assumption. Consequently, a large class of known schemes can be instantiated more efficiently with the new more compact decisional assumptions, while offering the same generic security guarantees. To support this belief, in Sect. 5 we show how to construct 1 We actually assume that k and are considered as constants, i.e., they do not depend on the security parameter. Otherwise, for a general D ,k , it is not so easy to solve the D ,k -MDDH problem with the only help of a (k + 1)-linear map, because determinants of size k + 1 could not be computable in polynomial time.
some fundamental primitives based on any Matrix Assumption. All constructions are purely algebraic and therefore very easy to understand and prove.
• Public-key Encryption. We build a key encapsulation mechanism with security against passive adversaries from any D ,k -MDDH Assumption. [13] , password-authenticated key exchange [20] , zero-knowledge proofs [1] and many other things.
• Pseudo-Random Functions. Generalizing the Naor-Reingold PRF [6, 37] , we build a pseudo-random function PRF from any D ,k -MDDH Assumption. The secret key consists of transformation matrices T 1 , . . . , T n (derived from independent instances A i, j ← D ,k ) plus a vector h of group elements. For x ∈ {0, 1} n , we
Using the random self-reducibility of the D ,k -MDDH Assumption, we give a tight security proof.
• Groth-Sahai non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Groth and Sahai [21] proposed very elegant and efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) and noninteractive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) proofs that work directly for a wide class of languages that are relevant in practice. We show how to instantiate their proof system based on any D ,k -MDDH Assumption. While the size of the proofs depends only on and k, the CRS and verification depend on the representation size of the Matrix Assumptions. Therefore, our new instantiations offer improved efficiency over the 2-Lin-based construction from [21] . This application in particular highlights the usefulness of the Matrix Assumption to describe in a compact way many instantiations of a scheme: Instead of having to specify the constructions for the DDH and the 2-Lin assumptions separately [21] , we can recover them as a special case of a general construction.
More Efficient Proofs for CRS-Dependent Languages. In Sect. 6, we provide more efficient NIZK proofs for concrete natural languages which are dependent on the common reference string. More specifically, the common reference string of the D ,k -MDDH instantiation of Groth-Sahai proofs of Sect. 5.4 includes as part of the commitment keys the matrix [A], where A ∈ Z ×k q ← D ,k . We give more efficient proofs for several languages related to A. Although at first glance the languages considered may seem quite restricted, they naturally appear in many applications, where typically A is the public key of some encryption scheme and one wants to prove statements about ciphertexts. More specifically, we obtain improvements for several kinds of statements, namely:
• Subgroup Membership Proofs. We give more efficient proofs in the language L A,G,P := {[A r], r ∈ Z k q } ⊂ G . To quantify some concrete improvement, in the 2-Lin case, our proofs of membership are half of the size of a standard GrothSahai proof and they require only six group elements. We stress that this improve-ment is obtained without introducing any new computational assumption. As an example of application, consider, for instance, the encryption scheme derived from our KEM based on any D ,k -MDDH Assumption, where the public key is some matrix [A], A ← D ,k . To see which kind of statements can be proved using our result, note that a ciphertext is a re-randomization of another one only if their difference is in L A,G,P . The same holds for proving that two commitments with the same key hide the same value or for showing in a publicly verifiable manner that the ciphertext of our encryption scheme opens to some known message [m] . This improvement has a significant impact on recent results, like [17, 35] , and we think many more examples can be found. Interestingly, in independent work, a number of results ( [25, 26, 31, 34] ) have constructed even more efficient proofs in linear subspaces by also exploiting the dependency of the common reference string and the matrix which generates the space. We note that although in all these work proofs are shorter, this is at the cost of having only computationally sound proofs, while our results retain the perfect soundness inherited from Groth-Sahai proofs.
• Ciphertext Validity and Plaintext Equality. Similar techniques apply to get more efficient proofs of statements which naturally appear when one wants to prove that a ciphertext is valid and that two ciphertexts encrypted with different public keys open to the same plaintext, e.g., when using Naor-Yung techniques to obtain chosen-ciphertext security [39] , like in the encryption schemes of [10, 15, 22, 27 ].
Preliminaries

Notation
For n ∈ N, we write 1 n for the string of n ones. Moreover, |x| denotes the length of a bitstring x, while |S| denotes the size of a set S. Further, s ← S denotes the process of sampling an element s from S uniformly at random. For an algorithm A, we write z ← A(x, y, . . .) to indicate that A is a (probabilistic) algorithm that outputs z on input (x, y, . . .). If A is a matrix, we denote by a i j the entries and a i the column vectors.
Representing Elements in Groups
Let Gen be a probabilistic polynomial-time (ppt) algorithm that on input 1 λ returns a description G = (G, q, P) of a cyclic group G of order q for a λ-bit prime q and a generator P of G. More generally, for any fixed k ≥ 1, let MGen k be a ppt algorithm that on input 1 λ returns a description
, where G and G T k are cyclic additive groups of prime order q, P a generator of G, and e k : G k → G T k is a (non-degenerated, efficiently computable) k-linear map. For k = 2, we define PGen := MGen 2 to be a generator of a bilinear group PG = (G, G T , q, e, P).
For an element a ∈ Z q , we define [a] = aP as the implicit representation of a in G. More generally, for a matrix A = (a i j ) ∈ Z n×m q we define [A] as the implicit representation of A in G and [A] T k as the implicit representation of A in G T k :
When talking about elements in G and G T k , we will always use this implicit notation, i.e., we let [a] ∈ G be an element in G or [b] T k be an element in G T k . Note that from [a] ∈ G, it is generally hard to compute the value a (discrete logarithm problem in G).
Also, all functions and operations acting on G and G T k will be defined implicitly. For example, when evaluating a bilinear pairing e :
we will use again our implicit representation and write
Standard Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
Let Gen be a ppt algorithm that on input 1 λ returns a description G = (G, q, P) of cyclic group G of prime order q and a generator P of G. Similarly, let PGen be a ppt algorithm that returns a description PG = (G, G T , q, e, P) of a pairing group. We informally recall a number of previously considered decisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions.
•
2-PDDH = DDH and 3-PDDH was proposed in [7] .
• k-Exponent Diffie-Hellman (k-EDDH) Assumption [28, 47] . It is hard to distinguish
Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
A key encapsulation mechanism KEM = (Gen, Enc, Dec) with key space K(λ) consists of three polynomial-time algorithms (PTAs). Via (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 λ ), the randomized key generation algorithm produces public/secret keys for security parameter λ ∈ N; via (K , c) ← Enc(pk), the randomized encapsulation algorithm creates a uniformly distributed symmetric key K ∈ K(λ) together with a ciphertext c; via K ← Dec(sk, c), the possessor of secret key sk decrypts ciphertext c to get back a key K which is an element in K or a special rejection symbol ⊥. For consistency, we require that for all λ ∈ N, and all (K , c) ← Enc(pk) we have Pr[Dec(sk, c) = K ] = 1, where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 λ ), and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above. For IND-CPA security, we require that the distribution (pk, (c, K )) is computationally indistinguishable from (pk, (c, K )), where (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 λ ), (K , c) ← Enc(pk) and K ← K(λ). An IND-CPA secure KEM implies an IND-CPA secure public-key encryption (PKE) scheme by combining it with a one-time secure symmetric cipher (DEM).
Hash Proof Systems
We recall the notion of hash proof systems as introduced by Cramer and Shoup [13] .
Let C, K be sets and V ⊂ C a language. In the context of public-key encryption (and viewing a hash proof system as a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) [14] with "special algebraic properties"), one may think of C as the set of all ciphertexts, V ⊂ C as the set of all valid (consistent) ciphertexts, and K as the set of all symmetric keys. Let sk : C → K be a hash function indexed with sk ∈ SK, where SK is a set. A hash function sk is projective if there exists a projection μ : SK → PK such that μ(sk) ∈ PK defines the action of sk over the subset V. That is, for every c ∈ V, the value K = sk (c) is uniquely determined by μ(sk) and c. In contrast, nothing is guaranteed for c ∈ C \ V, and it may not be possible to compute sk (c) from μ(sk) and c. The projective hash function is (perfectly) universal 1 
where in the above pk = μ(sk) for sk ← SK and K ← K, and the symbol ≡ stands for equality of the two distributions. A hash proof system HPS = (Param, Pub, Priv) consists of three algorithms where the randomized algorithm Param(1 λ ) generates instances of params = (S, K, C, V, PK, SK, (·) : C → K, μ : SK → PK), where S may contain some additional structural parameters such as the group description. The deterministic public evaluation algorithm Pub inputs the projection key pk = μ(sk), c ∈ V and a witness w of the fact that c ∈ V and returns K = sk (c). The deterministic private evaluation algorithm inputs sk ∈ SK and returns sk (c), without knowing a witness. We further assume there are efficient algorithms given for sampling sk ∈ SK and sampling c ∈ V uniformly together with a witness w.
As computational problem we require that the subset membership problem is hard in HPS which means that the two elements c and c are computationally indistinguishable, for uniform c ∈ V and uniform c ∈ C \ V.
Pseudo-Random Functions
A pseudo-random function PRF = (Gen, F) with respect to range R = R(λ) and message space M = M(λ) consists of two algorithms, where the randomized algorithm Gen(1 λ ) generates a symmetric key K and the deterministic evaluation algorithm F K (x) outputs a value in R, for all x ∈ M. For security we require that an adversary making polynomially many queries to an oracle O(·), the output of oracle
where f is chosen uniformly from all functions from mapping M to R (i.e., f (x) outputs uniform elements in R).
Matrix DH Assumptions
Definition
Definition 1. Let , k ∈ N with > k. We call D ,k a matrix distribution if it outputs (in poly time, with overwhelming probability) matrices in Z ×k q of full rank k. We define
For simplicity, we will also assume that, wlog, the first k rows of A ← D ,k form an invertible matrix.
We define the D ,k -matrix problem as to distinguish the two distributions
where the probability is taken over We note that using the transformation matrix, one can alternatively define the advantage from Definition 2 as
where the probability is taken over
and the coin tosses of adversary D.
Basic Properties
We can generalize is equivalent to m independent instances of the problem (with the same A but different w i ). This can be proved through a hybrid argument with a loss of m in the reduction, or, with a tight reduction (independent of m) via random self-reducibility.
and the probability is taken over
and the coin tosses of adversary D .
Proof. The case 1 ≤ m ≤ − k comes from a natural hybrid argument, while the case m > − k is obtained from the inequality
To prove it, we show that there exists an efficient transformation of any instance
of the m-fold problem, with overwhelming probability.
In particular, we set Z = AR + ZC, for random matrices R ← Z k×m q and C ← Z ( −k)×m q . On the one hand, if Z = AW, then Z = AW for W = R + WC, which is uniformly distributed in Z k×m q . On the other hand, if Z = U is uniform, then A|U is full rank with probability at least 1 − 1/(q − 1). In that case, Z = AR + UC is uniformly distributed in Z ×m q , which proves the above inequality.
We remark that, given [A], [ z] the above lemma can only be used to re-randomize the value [ z] . In order to re-randomize the matrix [A], we need that one can sample matrices L and R such that A = LAR looks like an independent instance A ← D ,k . In all of our example distributions, we are able to do this.
Due to its linearity properties, the D ,k -MDDH assumption does not hold in (k + 1)-linear groups, assuming that k is constant, i.e., it does not depend on the security parameter. 2
Proof. In a (k + 1)-linear group, the implicit representation of any r × r determinant for r ≤ k +1 can be efficiently computed by using the r -linear map given by the Leibnitz formula: Otherwise det(A 0 ) = 0. Then rank(A 0 || z 0 ) = rank(A 0 ) when z = A w, while rank(A 0 || z 0 ) = rank(A 0 )+1 with overwhelming probability if z is random. To compute the rank of both matrices, the following efficient randomized algorithm can be used. Take random invertible matrices L, R ∈ Z k×k q . Then set
, which is just a randomized instance of the same problem. Now if rank(A 0 ) = r , then with overwhelming probability its principal r × r minor is nonzero. Therefore, we can estimate r = rank(A 0 ) as the size of the largest nonzero principal minor (with negligible error probability). Finally, if the determinant of the submatrix of A 0 || z 0 formed by the first r + 1 rows and the first r and the last column is nonzero, we conclude that z is random.
Generic Hardness of Matrix DH
Let D ,k be a matrix distribution as in Definition 1, which outputs matrices A ∈ Z ×k q . We call D ,k polynomial-induced if the distribution is defined by picking t ∈ Z d q uniformly at random and setting a i, j := p i, j ( t) for some polynomials p i, j ∈ Z q [ T ] whose degree does not depend on λ. For example, for 2-Lin from Sect. 1.1, we have a 1,1 = t 1 , a 2,2 = t 2 , a 2,1 = a 3,2 = 1 and a 1,2 = a 3,1 = 0 with t 1 , t 2 (called a 1 , a 2 in Sect. 1.1) uniform.
We set
Consider the ideal I 0 generated by all f i, j 's and g i 's and the ideal I 1 generated only by the Proof. Note that J ≤m captures precisely what any adversary can generically compute with polynomially many group and m-linear pairing operations. Formally, this is proven by restating the Uber-Assumption Theorem of [2, 9] and its proof more algebraically. Cf. "Appendix 2" for details.
For a given matrix distribution, the condition (J 0 ) ≤m = (J 1 ) ≤m can be verified by direct linear algebra or by elimination theory (using, e.g., Gröbner bases). 3 For the special case = k + 1, we can actually give a criterion that is simple to verify using determinants: This theorem and generalizations for nonlinear p i, j and non-irreducible d are proven in "Appendix 2" using tools from algebraic geometry.
If the matrices output by
Examples of D ,k -MDDH
Let D ,k be a matrix distribution and A ← D ,k . Looking ahead to our applications, [A] will correspond to the public key (or common reference string) and [A w] ∈ G will correspond to a ciphertext. We define the representation size RE G (D ,k ) of a given polynomial-induced matrix distribution D ,k with linear p i, j 's as the minimal number of group elements it takes to represent [A] for any A ∈ D ,k . We will be interested in families of distributions D ,k such that that Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption is hard in k-linear groups. By Lemma 2, we obtain a family of strictly weaker assumptions. Our goal is to obtain such a family of assumptions with small (possibly minimal) representation.
The next lemma says that U ,k -MDDH is the weakest possible assumption among all D ,k -Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumptions. However, U ,k has poor representation, i.e.,
and R ∈ Z k×k q are two random invertible matrices, it is possible to get a properly distributed instance of the
Indeed, LAR has a distribution statistically close to the uniform distribution 4 
where
It was shown in [45] that k-Lin holds in the generic k-linear group model, and hence k-Lin forms a family of increasingly strictly weaker assumptions. Furthermore, in [7] it was shown that 2-Lin ⇒ BDDH.
Matrix A bears resemblance to a cascade which explains the assumption's name. Indeed, in order to compute the right lower entry w k of matrix (A, A w) from the remaining entries, one has to "descend" the cascade to compute all the other entries
A more compact version of C k is obtained by setting all a i := a.
Observe that the same trick cannot be applied to the k-Linear assumption k-Lin, as the resulting Symmetric k-Linear assumption does not hold in k-linear groups. However, if we set a i := a+i −1, we obtain another matrix distribution with compact representation.
The last three examples need some work to prove its generic hardness.
Theorem 6. k-Casc, k-SCasc and k-ILin are hard in generic k-linear groups.
Proof. We need to consider the (statistically close) variants with a i ∈ Z q rather than 1 , which has total degree k+1. As all matrices in C k have rank k, because the determinant of the last k rows in A is always 1, by Theorem 4 we conclude
As before, by Theorem 4, k-SCasc is hard in k-linear groups. Finally, in the case of k-ILin we will show in the next section its equivalence to k-SCasc, and therefore, it is generically hard in k-linear groups.
The previous examples can be related to some known assumptions from Sect. 2.3. Figure 1 depicts the relations that are also stated in next theorem, except the equivalence of k-ILin and k-SCasc which is addressed in the next section. We stress that this equivalence together with Theorem 7 implies that k-SCasc is a stronger assumption than k-Lin, previously unknown [16] .
Theorem 7.
For any k ≥ 2, the following holds:
Proof. The proof of all implications can be found in "Appendix 1".
Uniqueness of One-Parameter Matrix DH Problems
Some differently looking MDDH assumptions can be tightly equivalent, or isomorphic, meaning that there is a very tight generic reduction between the corresponding problems. These reductions are mainly based on the algebraic nature of the MDDH problems. The simplest and most compact polynomial-induced matrix distributions D k are the one-parameter linear ones, where D k outputs matrices A(t) = A 0 + A 1 t for a uniformly distributed t ∈ Z q , and fixed A 0 , A 1 ∈ Z (k+1)×k q . The two examples of them given in [16] are SC k and IL k .
A natural question is whether such a tight algebraic reduction exists between SC k and IL k . In this section, we prove a much stronger result, which states there exists essentially a single one-parameter linear MDDH problem. Indeed, we show that all one-parameter linear D k -MDDH problems are isomorphic to SC k . This result is heavily related to the one-parameter nature of the problems considered, and it seems to be not generalizable to broader families of MDDH problems (e.g., trying to relate C k and L k , or dealing with the case > k + 1).
Hardness
Theorem 4 gives an easy-to-check sufficient condition ensuring the D k -MDDH assumption holds in generic k-linear groups for certain matrix distributions D k , including the one-parameter linear ones. For this particular family, the sufficient condition is that all matrices A(t) = A 0 + A 1 t have full rank for all t ∈ Z q , the algebraic closure of the finite field Z q , and the determinant d of (A(T ) Z ) as a polynomial in Z , T has total degree k + 1. We first show that indeed it is also a necessary condition for the hardness of the D k -MDDH problem.
Theorem 8. Let D k be a one-parameter linear matrix distribution, producing matrices
with total degree k + 1, and the rank of A 0 + A 1 t is always k, for all t ∈ Z q .
Proof. The proof just consists in finding a nonzero polynomial h ∈ Z q [ Z , T ] of degree at most k such that h(A(t) w, t) = 0 for all t ∈ Z q and w ∈ Z k q , and then using it to solve the D k -MDDH problem. If the total degree of d is at most k, then we can simply let h = d. 5 Otherwise, assume that the degree of d is k + 1. If d is reducible, from Lemma 21 it follows that d can be split as
has too many roots, so it is the zero polynomial. Therefore, we are done by taking h = d 0 .
Finally, observe that
) and the c i (t) are the (signed) k-minors of A(t). Therefore, if A(t 0 ) has rank less than k for some
q , which means that c i (t 0 ) = 0 for all i. As a consequence, T − t 0 divides all c i , and hence it divides d, that is, d is reducible.
Once we have found the polynomial h of degree at most k, an efficient distinguisher can use the k-linear map to evaluate
can be computed easily from [A(t)] because A 0 and A 1 are known. If z = A(t) w, then h( z, t) = 0, while for a randomly chosen z, h( z, t) = 0 with overwhelming probability. 6 Then the distinguisher succeeds with an overwhelming probability.
Isomorphic Problems
From now on, we consider in this section a one-parameter linear matrix distribution D k such that D k -MDDH assumption holds in generic k-linear groups. This in particular means that using Theorem 8, the polynomial d is irreducible in Z q [ Z , T ] with total degree k + 1 and that the rank of A 0 + A 1 t is always k, for all t ∈ Z q . Clearly, the rank of A 0 is k, but also A 1 has rank k. Indeed, it is easy to see that the coefficients of the monomials of degree k + 1 in d are exactly the (signed) k-minors of A 1 , so they cannot be all zero.
There are some natural families of maps that generically transform MDDH problems into MDDH problems. As mentioned in previous sections, some examples of them are 5 Actually, it is assumed that d = 0, i.e., some matrices output by D k have full rank. Otherwise, it is not hard finding the polynomial h based on a nonzero maximal minor of A(t), by adding to it an extra row and the column Z . 6 As a polynomial of total degree at most k, it vanishes with probability at most k/q at a uniformly distributed point. left and right multiplication by an invertible constant matrix. More precisely, let L ∈ G L k+1 (Z q ), the set of all invertible matrices in Z 
From an algebraic point of view, we can see the above transformation as changing the bases used to represent certain linear maps as matrices.
In the particular case of one-parameter linear matrix distributions, one can write A (t) = LA(t)R = LA 0 R + LA 1 Rt, which simply means defining A 0 = LA 0 R and
defined by f 0 ( w) = A 0 w and f 1 ( w) = A 1 w. We need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 9. If D k is generically hard in k-linear groups, no nontrivial subspace U
Proof. Assume for contradiction a nontrivial subspace U exists such that f 0 (U ) = f 1 (U )s and consider the natural automorphism φ :
It is well defined due to the injectivity of f 0 and f 1 . Then, there exists an eigenvector v = 0 of φ for some eigenvalue λ ∈ Z q . The equation
Therefore, f 0 − λ f 1 is no longer injective and A(−λ) = A 0 − λA 1 has rank strictly less than k, which contradicts Theorem 8.
Applying the lemma iteratively, one can build special bases for the spaces Z k q and Z k+1 q and obtain canonical forms simultaneously for A 0 and A 1 , as described in the proof of the following theorem, which has some resemblance to the construction of Jordan normal forms of endomorphisms. The proof is rather technical, and it can be found in "Appendix 3". 
Proof. Combining the previous results, the maps f 0 , f 1 defined from the hard D k -MDDH problem are injective and they can be represented in the bases given in Theorem 10. In terms of matrices, this means that there exist
which concludes the proof.
As an example, we show an explicit isomorphism between SC 2 -MDDH and IL 2 -MDDH problems.
We stress that 'isomorphic' does not mean 'identical,' and it is still useful having at hand different representations of essentially the same computational problem, as it would help in finding applications.
Basic Applications
Public-Key Encryption
Let Gen be a group generating algorithm and D ,k be a matrix distribution that outputs a matrix over Z ×k q such that the first k-rows form an invertible matrix with overwhelming probability. We define the following key encapsulation mechanism KEM Gen,D ,k = (Gen, Enc, Dec) with key space K = G −k .
• Gen(1 λ ) runs G ← Gen 
• Enc pk picks w ← Z k q . The ciphertext/key pair is
Correctness follows by the equation Proof. By the D ,k Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption, the distribution of (pk, [ c],
where u ← Z q .
Hash Proof Systems
Let D ,k be a matrix distribution. We build a universal 1 hash proof system HPS = (Param, Pub, Priv), whose hard subset membership problem is based on the D ,k Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption.
• Param(1 λ ) runs G ← Gen(1 λ ) and picks A ← D ,k . Define the language
The output of Param is params
Correctness follows by (3) and the definition of μ. Clearly, under the D ,k -Matrix DiffieHellman Assumption, the subset membership problem is hard in HPS.
We now show that is a universal 1 projective hash function. Let [ c] ∈ C \ V be an element outside of the language. Then the matrix (A|| c) ∈ Z ×(k+1) q is of full rank k + 1 and consequently
We remark that can be transformed into a universal 2 projective hash function by applying a four-wise independent hash function [30] . Alternatively, one can construct a computational version of a universal 2 projective hash function as follows. 
Pseudo-Random Functions
Let Gen be a group generating algorithm and D ,k be a matrix distribution that outputs a matrix over Z ×k q such that the first k-rows form an invertible matrix with overwhelming probability. We define the following pseudo-random function PRF Gen,D ,k = (Gen, F) with message space M = {0, 1} n and range R = G k . For simplicity, we assume that − k divides k.
. . , n and j = 1, . . . , t := k/( − k) and computes the transformation matrices
. . , n, define the aggregated transformation matrices
The key is defined as
is the PRF from Lewko and Waters [33] . A more efficient PRF from the k-SCasc Assumption is given in "Appendix 5.2". Note that the elements T 1 , . . . , T t of the secret key consist of the transformation matrices of independently sampled matrices A i, j . Interestingly, for a number of distributions D ,k the distribution of the transformation matrix T is the same. For example, the transformation matrix for L k consists of a uniform row vector, so does the transformation matrix for C k and for U k+1,k . Consequently, PRF Gen,C k = PRF Gen,L k = PRF Gen,U k+1,k and in light of the theorem below, PRF Gen,L k proposed by Lewko and Waters can also be proved on the U k+1,k -MDDH assumption, the weakest among all MDDH assumptions of matching dimensions.
Theorem 12. Under the
The proof is based on the augmented cascade construction of Boneh et al. [6] . Here we give a direct self-contained proof. We first state and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 13. Let Q be a polynomial. Under the
Proof. By a hybrid argument over j = 1, . . . , t, it is sufficient to show that
is computationally indistinguishable from a uniform [H 1 ] ← G ×Q , i.e., for one single transformation matrixT 1 of A 1 ← D ,k . This in turn follows directly by Lemma 1 (random self-reducibility of D ,k -MDDH). Note that the overall loss in the security reduction is k = t · ( − k), where the factor t stems from the hybrid argument and the factor − k stems from Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 12. For x ∈ {0, 1} n and 0 ≤ μ ≤ n, define suffix μ (x) as the μ-th suffix of x, i.e., suffix μ (x) := (x n−μ+1 , . . . , x n ). We make the convention that suffix 0 (x) = ε, the empty string. We will use a hybrid argument over n, the bitlength of x. In Hybrid μ (0 ≤ μ ≤ n), let RF μ : {0, 1} μ → Z k q be a truly random function and define the oracle 
is a random function on μ bits and 
is a random function on μ + 1 bits and
perfectly simulates oracle O μ+1 from Hybrid μ + 1. We remark that the loss in the reduction is independent of the number of queries Q to oracle O, i.e., the reduction loses a factor of nk, where the factor n stems from the above hybrid argument, and the factor k from Lemma 13.
Groth-Sahai Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Groth and Sahai gave a method to construct non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) and non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs for satisfiability of a set of equations in a bilinear group PG. (For formal definitions of NIWI and NIZK proofs, we refer to [21] .) The equations in the set can be of different types, but they can be written in a unified way as
, t ∈ A T are the constants and f : A 1 × A 2 → A T is a bilinear map. More specifically, considering only symmetric bilinear groups, equations are of one of these types: i) Pairing product equations, with
Overview. The GS proof system allows to construct NIWI and NIZK proofs for satisfiability of a set of equations of the type (4), i.e., proofs that there is a choice of variables-the witness-satisfying all equations simultaneously. The prover gives to the verifier a commitment to each element of the witness and some additional information, the proof. Commitments and proof satisfy some related set of equations computable by the verifier because of their algebraic properties. We stress that to compute the proof, the prover needs the randomness which it used to create the commitments. To give new instantiations of GS proofs, we need to specify the distribution of the common reference string, which includes the commitment keys and some maps whose purpose is roughly to give some algebraic structure to the commitment space.
Commitments. We will now construct commitments to elements in Z q and G. The commitment key To commit to [y] ∈ G using randomness r ← Z k+1 q , we define maps ι : G → Z q and p : G → Z q as
where ξ ∈ Z q is an arbitrary vector such that ξ A = 0 and ξ · z = ( u 1 , . . . , u k+1 ) for all [y] ∈ G which implies that the commitments are perfectly hiding.
To commit to a scalar x ∈ Z q using randomness s ← Z k q , we define the maps ι : Z q → Z q and p : G → Z q as
where ξ is defined as above. Note that, given x, ι(x) is not efficiently computable, but [ι(x)] is, and this suffices to compute the commitment. On a binding key (soundness setting), we have that p ([ι (x)]) = x for all x ∈ Z q and p ([ u i ]) = 0 for all i = 1 . . . k so the commitment is perfectly binding. On a hiding key (WI setting), ι (x) ∈ Span( u 1 , . . . , u k ) for all x ∈ Z q , which implies that the commitment is perfectly hiding.
It will also be convenient to define a vector of commitments as
and the inclusion maps are defined component-wise.
Inclusion and Projection Maps. As we have seen, commitments are elements of G . The main idea of GS NIWI and NIZK proofs is to give some algebraic structure to the commitment space (in this case, G ) so that the commitments to a solution in A 1 , A 2 of a certain set of equations satisfy a related set of equations in some larger modules. 
To complete the details of the new instantiation, we must specify for each type of equation, for both F = F and F =F: a) some maps ι T and p T such that for all , where k 1 , k 2 are the number of columns of U 1 , U 2 , respectively, and which, in the witness indistinguishability setting, are a basis of all the matrices which are a solution of the equation
where U 1 , U 2 are either U or A, depending on the modules A 1 , A 2 . These matrices are necessary to randomize the NIWI and NIZK proofs.
To present the instantiations in concise form, in the following H r,s,m,n = (h i j ) ∈ Z m×n q denotes the matrix such that h rs = −1, h sr = 1 and h i j = 0 for (i, j) / ∈ {(r, s), (s, r )}. In summary, the elements which must be defined are as follows:
• Pairing product equations. In this case,
, U 1 = U 2 = U and for both F = F and F =F, .
• Multi-scalar multiplication equations. In this case,
, U 1 = A, U 2 = U and for both F =F and
The equation [AH]• [U] = [0] T admits no solution, while all the solutions to [AH] • [U] = [0] T are generated by H r,s,k,k+1
1≤r <s≤k .
• Quadratic equations. In this case,
p and U 1 = U 2 = A, for both F =F and F = F, we define Proof and Verification. For completeness, we now describe how do the prover and the verifier proceed. Define k 1 , k 2 as the number of columns of U 1 , U 2 respectively. On input PG, [U], z, a set of equations and a set of witnesses x ∈ A m 1 , y ∈ A n 2 the prover proceeds as follows: 1. Commit to x and y as
where 
The proof described above is for a general equation the same optimizations for special types of equation as in the full version of [21] apply. In particular, when the map used is the symmetric map F, the size of the proof can be reduced. In addition, the size of the proof can also be reduced when all the elements in either A 1 or A 2 are constants. Taking these optimizations into account, we give the size of the commitments and the proof for the different types of equations in Table 1 .
To
verify a proof, on input the commitments [C], [D] and a proof ([ ], [ ]), the verifier checks whether
where • is either • or•, depending on whether F is F orF. If the equation is satisfied, the verifier accepts the proof for this equation and rejects otherwise. In general, the verification cost depends on and k, though a bit might be gained in pairing computations when using batch verification techniques and if some components of the commitment keys are trivial or are repeated, i.e., if the D ,k admits short representation.
Efficiency. We emphasize that for D ,k = L 2 and z = (0, 0, 1) and for D ,k = DDH and z = (0, 1) (in the natural extension to asymmetric bilinear groups), we recover the 2-Lin and the SXDH instantiations of [21] . While the size of the proofs depends only on and k, both the size of the CRS and the cost of verification increase with RE G (D ,k ) . In particular, in terms of efficiency, the SC 2 Assumption is preferable to the 2-Lin assumption, but the main reason to consider more instantiations of GS proofs is to obtain more efficient proofs for a large class of languages in Sect. 6.
More Efficient Proofs for Some CRS-Dependent Languages
Let [U] be the commitment key defined in last section as part of a D ,k -MDDH instantiation, for some A ← D ,k . In this section, we show how to obtain shorter proofs of some languages related to A. The common idea of all the improvements is to exploit the special structure of the homomorphic commitments used in Groth-Sahai proofs.
More Efficient Subgroup Membership Proofs
We first show how to obtain shorter proofs of membership in the language L A,PG :
Intuition. Our proofs implicitly use the GS framework, although we have preferred to give the proofs without using the GS notation. Indeed, the idea behind our improvement is to exploit the special algebraic structure of commitments in GS proofs, namely the
that [ ] ∈ L A,PG , we proceed as if we were giving a GS proof of satisfability of the equation x = 0 where the randomness used for the commitment to x is r . In particular, no commitments have to be given in the proof, which results in shorter proofs. To prove zero-knowledge, we rewrite the equation x = 0 as x · δ = 0. The real proof is just a standard GS proof with the commitment to δ = 1 being ι (1) = com [U] (1; 0), while in the simulated proof the trapdoor allows to open ι (1) as a commitment to 0, so we can proceed as if the equation was the trivial one x · 0 = 0, for which it is easy to give a proof of satisfiability.
Related Work. It is interesting to compare in detail with a recent line of work aiming at obtaining very efficient arguments of membership in linear subspaces ( [25, 26, 31, 34] ) which also exploits the dependency of the common reference string and the space where one wants to prove membership in. More specifically, these works construct NIZK arguments of membership in the space generated by [A] ∈ G ×k , with perfect zero-knowledge and computational soundness. We compare our results with [31] , who give two different constructions which generalize and simplify previous results. In their work, computational soundness is based on any D m -MDDH Assumption. 7 In the first construction, the proof size is m + 1 and the common reference string must include The proof follows directly by implicitly reconstructing the same arguments which prove the same properties for the GS proof system. 
Verifier. On input σ, [ ], [ ], the verifier checks whether
This proves perfect completeness. Soundness. Let ξ ∈ Z q be any vector such that ξ A = 0, ξ z = 1. This implies that in the soundness setting, ξ u k+1 = 1. Therefore, if [ ] is any proof that satisfies the verification equation, multiplying on the left by ξ and the right by ξ ,
we obtain
Since 
Since with overwhelming probability, A has rank k, it must hold that ( 1 − 2 ) + ( 1 − 2 ) = 0, that is, it must hold that ( 1 − 2 ) ∈ H. By construction, for both honestly generated proofs [ ] and simulated proofs these differences are uniformly distributed in H.
Efficiency Comparison and Applications
For the 2-Lin assumption, ( = 3, k = 2), our proof consists of only six group elements, whereas without using our technique the proof consists of 12 elements. 8 More generally, to prove that [ ] ∈ L A,PG , for some A ← D ,k with a GS instantiation based on a (possibly unrelated) D ,k -matrix DH problem using standard GS proofs, one would prove that the following equation is satisfiable for all i = 1 . . . :
that is, one needs to prove that linear equations with k variables are satisfied. Therefore, according to Table 1 , the verifier must be given k elements of G for the commitments and k elements of G for the proof. On the other hand, proving [ ] ∈ L A,PG using our approach requires k elements of G, corresponding to the size of the proof of one quadratic equation.
Applications. For a typical application scenario of Theorem 14, think of [A] as part of the public parameters of the hash proof system of Sect. 5.2. Proving that a ciphertext is well formed is proving membership in L A,PG . Another application is to show that two ciphertexts encrypt the same message under the same public key, a common problem in electronic voting or anonymous credentials. There are many other settings in which subgroup membership problems naturally appear, for instance the problem of certifying public keys or given some plaintext m, the problem of proving that a certain ciphertext is an encryption of [m]. We stress that in our construction the setup of the CRS can be built on top of the encryption key so that proofs can be simulated without the decryption key, which is essential for many of these applications. More concretely, below we give two application examples. Application Example 1. The standard proof of membership in L A,PG , when A ← 2-Lin based on the same assumption (with = = 3, k = k = 2), requires 12 group elements, while with our approach only six elements are required. 9 This reduces the ciphertext size of one of the instantiations of [35] from 15 to 9 group elements.
Application Example 2. With our results, we can also give a more efficient proof of correct opening of the Cramer-Shoup ciphertext. We briefly recall the CS encryption scheme based on the 2-Lin-assumption ( [23, 45] ). The public key consists of the description of some group G and a tuple
a ciphertext is constructed by picking random r, s ∈ Z q and setting
where α is the hash of some components of the ciphertext and possibly some label. To prove that a ciphertext opens to a (known) message [m], substract [m] from the third component of the ciphertext and prove membership in L A α ,PG , where A α is defined as: in the WI, as required. The resulting proof consists of 10 group elements, as opposed to 16 using standard GS proofs. This applies to the result of [17] , Sect. 3.
Other CRS-Dependent Languages
The techniques of the previous section can be extended to other languages, namely:
• A proof of validity of a ciphertext, that is, given [A], A ← D ,k , and some vector z ∈ Z q , z / ∈ Im(A), one can use the same techniques to give a more efficient proof of membership in the space:
q × G is the witness. This is also a proof of membership in the subspace of G spanned by the columns of [A] and the vector z, but part of the witness, [m] , is in the group G and not in Z q , while part of the matrix generating the subspace is in Z q . However, it is not hard to modify the subgroup membership proofs as described in Sect. 6.1 to account for this. In particular, since the GS proof system is non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge when the witnesses are group elements, the proof guarantees both that [ c] is well formed and that the prover knows [m]. In a typical application, [ c] will be the ciphertext of some encryption scheme, in which case r will be the ciphertext randomness and [m] the message.
• A proof of plaintext equality. The encryption scheme derived from the KEM given in Sect. 5.1 corresponds to a commitment in GS proofs -except that the commitment is always binding. That is, if
where s := ( r , 0) and z := (0, . . . , 0, 1) . Therefore, given two (potentially distinct) matrix distributions
, proving equality of plaintexts of two ciphertexts encrypted under pk A , pk B , corresponds to proving that two commitments under different keys open to the same value. One can gain in efficiency with respect to the standard use of GS proofs because one does not need to give any commitments as part of the proof, since the ciphertexts themselves play this role. More specifically, given T , which is trivially satisfiable and can be simulated. In [27] , we reduce the size of the proof by four group elements from 18 to 22, while in [22] we save nine elements although their proof is quite inefficient altogether. We note that even if both papers give a proof that two ciphertexts under two different 2-Lin public keys correspond to the same value, the proof in [22] is more inefficient because it must use GS proofs for pairing product equations instead of multi-scalar multiplication equations. Other examples include [10, 15] .
Proof. The idea of the proof is that an instance of the (k + 1)-PDDH problem can be viewed as an instance of the C-MDDH problem with a non-uniform distribution of w. A suitable re-randomization of w yields the result.
. We will construct a k-Casc instance from that, setting [A] as follows: 
b is in the span of the columns of A, b will be a uniform element in the span of the columns of A, whereas if it is not, b will be uniform in all of Z k+1 q .
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of the preceding Lemma 15.
be a (k + 1)-EDDH instance with either z ∈ Z q uniform or z = x k+1 . We will construct a k-SCasc instance from that, defining [A] as the following k × (k + 1)-matrix: is zero. But det B is just the determinant polynomial of k-Casc defined in Sect. 3.3 and explicitly computed in the proof of Theorem 6. Namely,
where R k is a polynomial of degree k. Hence, to test whether det(B) = 0, we compute
. . , z k+1 )] T k using the k-linear map, and then we use the oracle k-MLDDH ([a 1 ] 
Proof. Both implications follow by simple re-randomization arguments. A k-SCasc instance ([a 1 ] 
Proof. To show the first implication, we transform a given instance of the k-Casc The same reduction also works in the symmetric case.
Appendix 2: Proofs for the Generic Hardness results
In this section, we give the remaining proofs for the results on the D ,k -MDDH assumption in generic m-linear groups from Sect. 3.3. We refer to reader to, e.g., [11] for necessary background on the algebraic material such as polynomial rings, ideals, Gröbner bases, varieties and irreducibility used in this section. Note that in this paper irreducibility is not implicit in the definition of a variety.
Recall that our setup is that D ,k is a matrix distribution which outputs a i, j = p i, j ( t) for uniform t ∈ Z d q and possibly multivariate polynomials p i, j , whose degree does not depend on λ and hence not on q.
In order to describe all of these data, we consider the polynomial ring Proof. The proof is analogous to the one from [2, 9] , apart from being stated more algebraically. Let D be a ppt distinguisher with input from D b for either b = 0 or b = 1. Let κ = poly(λ) be an upper bound on the number of D's oracle queries and initial input group elements. We will replace the oracles D has access to, show that this replacement can only be detected with negligible probability and show that D's advantage with the replaced oracles is zero.
Our replacement of D's oracles is as follows: We replace (the random representation of) G and its associated oracles by (a random representation 10 of) the quotient Q = R/I b . Similarly G T is replaced by an isomorphic copy Q of R/I b (with another random representation independent from the one for G). The oracle for e is replaced by an oracle computing the product in Q and outputting the (representation of the) associated element in Q . The initial elements
where π respectively π denotes the projection π : R → Q respectively π : R → Q . The generators g and g T are replaced by π(1) ∈ Q and π (1) ∈ Q . The representations of Q and Q are as usual defined on demand by keeping a list of all elements queried so far and choosing random representations for new elements; queries with representations as input that have not been previously defined produce an invalid answer ⊥, as do queries using the wrong isomorphic copy and/or mixing them. Note that we assume here that in the random group model the representations are sufficiently long, say a generous ≥ 5 log q, such that representations are hard to guess and the sets of representations for G and G T are disjoint with overwhelming probability. By Buchberger's First Criterion [11] , the given generating set G b is actually a Gröbner basis with respect to any lexicographic ordering, where any Z i 's are larger than any A i, j 's and both are larger than any T i 's or W i 's. We identify elements from R/I b by their remainders modulo G b . Note that computing this remainder just means replacing any occurrence of A i, j by p i, j and, if b = 0, additionally replacing Z i by j p i, j W j .
After D has run, we sample t u, t, ω) ] ∈ G, where we plug in u for Z , t for T and ω for W . Note that there are no A i, j 's in h and in the case b = 0 no Z i 's occur either. For h ∈ Q , we define ev(h ) ∈ G T analogously.
Since D can only apply e in Q, but not in Q , any element seen in Q by D can be written as a sum of elements initially presented to D. Elements seen in Q can be written as sums of m-fold products of such elements. So let k 1 , . . . , k r ∈ S ≤1 and k 1 , . . . , k r ∈ S ≤m with r + r ≤ κ be the elements constructed by D. Let h i := k i mod I b ∈ Q and
The distinct elements among the h i and h i are exactly the distinct elements from Q respectively Q seen by D, whereas the k i and k i keep track of how D constructed those. Note that the mod I b map need not be injective on S ≤m .
Since computing mod I b is just a replacement of each A i, j and possibly Z i by a polynomial of degree at most deg + 1, the total degree of all remainders h i and h i is bounded by the constant (deg + 1) m , where deg is the upper bound on the total degree of the p i, j , which is independent of the security parameter λ by assumption. Let Good denote the event that for all h i = h j we have ev(h i ) = ev(h j ) and for all h i = h j we have ev(h i ) = ev(h j ). By construction, if Good occurs, the view of D with the replaced oracles is identical to the view if D would have had access to the original oracles. Since each such equality ev(h i ) = ev(h j ) or ev(h i ) = ev(h j ) is a nonzero polynomial equation of total degree at most (deg + 1) m in uniformly chosen unknowns from Z q , each one holds only with probability at most (deg+1) m q = negl(λ). Since there are only polynomially many pairs i = j, Good occurs with overwhelming probability of at least 1 − For the other direction of the theorem, note that if there exists
T only with probability at most
The ideals J 0 and J 1 can be computed from I 0 and I 1 using elimination theory. If we use Gröbner bases for that, the condition (J 0 ) ≤m = (J 1 ) ≤m can be rephrased as follows: Now let k ∈ I 0 ∩ S ≤m = (J 0 ) ≤m be arbitrary. Since H 0 ∩ S is a Gröbner basis w.r.t to <, which sorts by total degree first, we have k = i e i h i for some e i ∈ S and h i ∈ H 0 ∩ S ≤deg k . Since we have shown that all the h i that appear here are in I 1 , we have k ∈ I 1 , showing (J 0 ) ≤m ⊂ (J 1 ) ≤m . The other inclusion is trivial.
Appendix 2.2: Proof of Theorem 4 and Generalizations
Theorem 4 will follow as a corollary from the following lemma, which is a generalization to nonlinear p i, j and non-irreducible d: For the second part of the lemma, we first observe that both ideals I 0 and I 1 are radical: Since they can be generated by polynomials of the form
Lemma 21. Let notation be as before. We assume that = k + 1 and A can be full rank for some values of t. Let d be the determinant of (p( T ) Z ) as a polynomial in Z , T and consider the ideal
expressing one set of variables as functions of another disjoint set of variables, the quotient R/I 0 respectively R/I 1 is isomorphic to
Since these quotients have no nilpotent elements, the ideals I 0 , I 1 are radical. It follows that J is radical, since intersection with a polynomial subring preserves being radical. Since d 0 is irreducible, the quotient 
If for some value of t, c( t) = 0, then det(p( t) z) = 0 for all values of z, hence p( t) has rank < k. Consider the variety V bad of all ( a, z, t) ∈ V (I 1 ) such that A = (a i, j ) has rank < k, which is indeed an algebraic set (consider det(A e i ) = 0 for canonical basis vectors e i ) and V bad ⊃ V (c, I 1 ). Outside of this bad set, A = p( t) has full rank k and hence there exists ω such that z = A · ω if and only if det(A z) = 0, or equivalently, since c(
By the same argument as in the previous paragraph, since d 0 is irreducible over Z q , the quotient
For the other direction, consider ( a, z, t) such that a = p( t) and there exists ω with z i = j ω j a i, j . We need to show d 0 ( z, t) = 0. For this, note that
is the zero polynomial. Since c( T ) is not the zero polynomial, as otherwise d( Z , T ) would be the zero polynomial, we have that
This lemma allows us to easily prove Theorem 4, which states: Let = k + 1 and D k+1,k be a matrix distribution, which outputs matrices A = p( t) for uniform t. Let d be the determinant of (p( T ) Z ) as a polynomial in Z , T . Proof. Let notation be as in the lemmas above.
(1): If c is non-constant, it would have some roots ( z, t) in Z q . At these roots p( t) can't have full rank, since det(p( t) z) = 0 for all z. 
Appendix 3: Proof of Theorem 10
The proof is rather technical because we need an explicit construction of a sequence of subspaces with special properties. The key idea is using a consequence of Lemma 9: for any nontrivial subspace U ⊂ Z k q , dim( f 0 (U ) + f 1 (U )) > dim U , and for any nontrivial subspace
This allows us to build a sequence of subspaces with strictly increasing dimensions having some interesting properties. We will then use these subspaces to build the bases claimed in the theorem.
Consider the following sequences of subspaces, for a suitable value of m ∈ Z 
On the other hand, since f 
and then all the equalities hold. As a consequence, if k is even, taking k = 2m we have shown that dim V i = 2i − 1 and dim U i = 2i. Otherwise, we take k = 2m − 1 and dim V i = 2i − 2 and dim U i = 2i − 1 (hence, V 1 is trivial here). In addition, the previous equalities of dimensions imply the corresponding equalities of subspaces U i = f
, which in particular mean that a generating set of U i can be constructed by computing the preimages of a generating set in V i for both f 0 and f 1 (these preimages always exist for vectors in any V i ⊂ V m = f 0 (U m ) ∩ f 1 (U m )). Similarly, we can build a generating set of V i+1 by applying f 0 and f 1 to a generating set of U i . We will also use the fact that Z m+1 q = f 0 (U m ) + f 1 (U m ) to complete a basis of Z k+1 q . At this point, we have constructed two sequences of subspaces which dimensions grow regularly, and we can build bases of the spaces by cleverly picking vectors from them. We consider separately the cases k even and k odd.
For k = 2m, we know that dim V 1 = 1. Let y ∈ Z k+1 q be a nonzero vector in V 1 . Then, x 0 = f The proof for the odd case k = 2m − 1 proceeds similarly, but starting from a nonzero vector x ∈ U 1 , computing the two images y 0 = f 0 ( x) and y 1 = f 1 ( x), and then applying the same iterative procedure as before to obtain the bases
. . . , ( f of Z k q and Z k+1 q , respectively, with exactly the same property as before.
Appendix 4: Subgroup Membership Proofs for 2-Lin
In this section we exemplify our approach from Sect. 6.1 for the 2-Lin case. Let Standard Groth-Sahai proof. In the standard approach, used for instance in [35] , the prover will show that there are two values r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z q such that the following equations hold:
Therefore, we are in the setting of multiscalar multiplication with A 1 = Z q and A 2 = G. For simulation, we sample some H ← H as before and we define:
[ sim ] = [ (w 1 , w 2 ) + AH ].
• Dec sk ([ c] ∈ G k ) recomputes the key as Security of KEM Gen,SC k follows from Theorem 11. Note that the size of the public/secret key is constant, compared to linear (in k) for the k-Lin-based KEM [23, 45] . The ciphertext size remains the same, however.
i-th step replaces the coefficients of a polynomial by its evaluations (up to the sign) at some random points b i,1 , . . . , b i,k .
